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INTRODUCTION
On April 29, 2019, the Utah Supreme Court issued a Supplemental Briefing
Order (“Order”) to which Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
“Gold’s Gym”), the Appellant in this appeal, hereby responds. The Utah Supreme
Court’s Order identified several legal issues and Gold’s Gym will now address the
legal issues the order as stated in the Order. It appears that the Order covers only
legal issues, as opposed to factual ones as well, and thus, Gold’s Gym will not
include in this Supplemental Brief an additional “Statement of the Case.” For the
Statement of the Case, Gold’s Gym refers this Court to its opening Appellate Brief.
Gold’s Gym will also not include in this Supplemental Brief an additional
“Statement of the Issues” because the Order already outlines the legal issues upon
which the Utah Supreme Court would like to focus.
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ARGUMENT
1. In Interpreting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Trial Court Concluded that Plaintiffs’ Claims Were Not Derivative, Yet Even
If They Were Derivative, They Fell Within the Closely Held Corporation
Exception. On March 21, 2019, the Honorable Todd Shaughnessy of the Third
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah submitted to the Utah Supreme Court a
Response to Temporary Remand Order and Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (“Judge Shaughnessy’s Response”). (Doc. 562). In Judge
Shaughnessy’s Response, he stated that his 2016 Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law made “no effort to re-examine these issues, and the court has no
recollection of having done so on the record. Rather, as stated at page 22 of the
findings, the court merely incorporated by reference Judge Toomey’s 2013
ruling….” (Doc. 562 ¶7). Thus, in order to correctly interpret the 2016 Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, reviewing Judge Toomey’s September 6, 2013
Memorandum Decision re: Gold’s Gym’s Summary Judgment Motion is necessary
(“Judge Toomey’s Memorandum Decision”). (Doc. 154 pp. 13-14). The relevant
part of Judge Toomey’s Memorandum Decision reads as follows:
The Court must first determine whether this is a derivative
action. Derivative suits seek to enforce rights belonging to the
corporation. Aurora Credit Serv. Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970
P.2d 1273, 1276 (Utah 1998). In contrast, direct actions by members
are appropriate where “the injury is one to the plaintiff as a
stockholder and to him individually, and not to the corporation, as
where the action is based on contract to which he is a party, or on a
Page 8 of 30

right belonging severally to him, or on a fraud affecting him directly,
it is an individual action.” Id. The Court is not convinced that this is
a derivative suit. First, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that
derivative actions may not be required where the corporation is
closely held with a limited number of principals. Here, the claims
are brought by two of the three remaining members of Health
Source; clearly, Health Source was closely held with a very limited
number of principals. Second, derivative actions are alleged against
the corporation itself. Here, Gold’s is challenging the claims against
Gold’s, not Health Source or Mr. Engle. Gold’s does not cite to
authority requiring a derivative suit for claims against a party who
is not the primary corporation.
Plaintiffs Clark Chamberlain and Brent Statham are not improper
parties, and Gold’s has not shown that this is a derivative action of the
sort that would require Health Source to be named a Plaintiff.
(Doc. 154) (September 6, 2013 Memorandum Decision re: Gold’s Summary
Judgment Motion, p.13-14) (Internal footnote omitted) (Emphasis added).
In examining Judge Toomey’s Memorandum Decision, as noted supra, the
trial court erroneously permitted this matter to proceed as a direct action because
the claims were asserted against a third party – Gold’s Gym – and not against
directors or managers of the company. The closely held corporation exception was
the trial court’s fall-back position in permitting the claims to proceed. The trial
court stated that “Health Source was closely held with a very limited number of
principals.” Accordingly, the interpretation of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is that the trial court allowed the claims to proceed because
the claims were not derivative and, even if they were, the closely held corporation
exception applied.
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The trial court also outlined generic case law, citing Aurora Credit Serv. Inc.
v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Utah 1998), to determine whether a
claim is, by nature, direct or derivative. Following this case law, the trial court held
that it was “not convinced that this is a derivative suit.” After citing the closely
held corporation exception as the exception to the general rule, the district court
provided a “first” legal conclusion to allow the claims to proceed. The trial court
reasoned that the claims were, by nature, not derivative because “derivative claims
are alleged against the corporation itself”, and Health Source was never a named
party to this action. Consequently, the trial court held that the claims were direct by
nature.
Therefore, the correct interpretation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law is that the trial court concluded that the claims were (i) not derivative by
nature, and (ii) even if they were derivative, the closely-held corporation exception
applied.
2. Gold’s Gym Was Significantly Prejudiced and Endured Six (6)
Additional Years of Litigation Because the Trial Court Determined that the
Claims Could Proceed Because They Were Not Derivative Claims. On
September 6, 2013, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision denying
Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the claims
because the Appellees lacked standing to bring the claims on behalf of the entity.
(Doc. 154). Gold’s Gym is a franchisor. Franchisors must report litigation in their
Page 10 of 30

federal and most state disclosure documents. FTC Rule 16 C. F.R. Part 436.
Reporting litigation often has a significant impact on the ability to sell new
franchises. This case lasted for an additional (6) six years with reporting
requirements because the Plaintiffs were erroneously allowed to pursue a direct
claim. The trial court’s September 6, 2013 Memorandum Decision meant that the
Appellees’ claims survived a motion for summary judgment, and as such, the
Appellees were privileged to bring claims that belonged to the entity and stepped
into the shoes of the entity in doing so. Moreover, Gold’s Gym incurred significant
legal expenses, costs, and time. Thus, the impact of the trial court’s decision that
the claims were not derivative had a long-lasting and substantial effect on Gold’s
Gym.
Second, the Appellees failed to comply with Rule URCP 23A that
establishes the procedural process with which a member of a company must
comply in order to bring a valid derivative claim on behalf of the company. The
failure to comply with Rule 23A was excused given the Trial Court’s ruling that
the claims were not derivative because Rule 23A was never followed by Appellees.
Thus, Appellees’ failure to comply with Rule 23A was another factor in
contributing to the delayed outcome of this case.
Third, the trial court’s decision to not require the claims to proceed
derivatively caused BACH to defend the claims that otherwise should have been
dismissed for lack of standing, causing BACH significant legal expenses, including
Page 11 of 30

additional oral and written discovery, motions, trial preparation, court-ordered
mediation, trying the claims before the court during a three-day bench trial,
arguing post-trial motions, and now this appeal. Put simply, the trial court missed
the mark on the crux of this case. Had the Appellees prevailed at trial, they would
be seeking attorneys’ fees under the exact same contract that BACH is now
seeking attorneys’ fees as prayed in the complaint for all claims (see complaint) ¶
¶5 120, 125, 131, 143, 159, 177, 183, 189, 205, 213, 218, and Eighteenth cause of
action) The Appellees prayed for attorney’s fees on both contract and tort claims
against Gold’s. See Complaint, Prayer ¶5. The Appellees claimed both damages
for their own indirect injuries resulting from loss of value to their membership
interests and also on behalf of Health- Source based on: (1) lost customer contracts
that belonged solely to Health Source; (2) lost equipment that the Appellees never
owned; and (3) expectation damages under the Health Source – Gold’s Gym
License Agreement. Moreover, all of the claims that were tried by Appellees arose
from and related to the Licensing Agreement containing an attorneys’ fee
provision. In other words, the Appellees were fully aware that they were bringing
claims arising directly under the contract that contained an attorneys’ fee provision
and that their claims were being brought on behalf of the entity. They cannot claim
the benefits of the contract to prosecute BACH, and then escape from the same
contract’s burdens when BACH prevails on all claims.
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3. The Courts of Utah Should No Longer Follow the Aurora Closely
Held Corporation Exception For Third Party Claims. For the following
reasons, the Aurora closely-held corporation exception should no longer be
followed by Utah courts, especially under these circumstances.
a) The District Court Applied Current Precedent Under Aurora to
Allow the Claims to Be Brought By a Member of a Limited Liability
Company. The trial Court’s decision to apply the closely-held corporation
exception in the context of claims being brought by a member of a limited liability
company is consistent with current Utah law. For example, the Utah Court of
Appeals in Banyan Inv. Co., LLC v. Evans, 2012 UT App 333, ¶ 14, 292 P.3d 698,
703, held that the closely-held corporation exception is applicable to limited
liability companies. The Banyan Court provided that “[w]e see no reason to deny
members of

LLCs the opportunity to invoke the closely-held corporation

exception, where appropriate, while subjecting them to the same requirements as
shareholders of corporations under rule 23A.” Id. The Utah Court of Appeals
further reasoned that closely-held LLCs are just as “vulnerable to malfeasance” as
are closely-held corporations. Id. (quoting Angel Inv'rs, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT
40, ¶ 21, 216 P.3d 944, 950). The rationale for this holding is founded upon the
following:
[I]n closely held corporations; it becomes easy for the majority
shareholders to identify themselves as the corporation. These
shareholders not only receive the majority of the profits
Page 13 of 30

the corporation generates, but they often serve on the board and make
operating decisions for the corporation....Majority shareholders of
closely held corporations have increased control over the corporation
because they likely serve on the corporation's board; their dual roles
can make malfeasance easier to conduct as well as justify. Likewise,
the nature of a closely held corporation, where there is often a small
number of shareholders and many of those may have close ties to each
other, lessens the likelihood that a minority shareholder will speak out
against corporate malfeasance. 1(Footnote Omitted)
As held by the Utah Court of Appeals in Banyan, the closely-held
corporation exception can apply to LLCs. To the extent that it applied the current
Utah law, as found in Banyan, supra, or in Aurora Credit Serv. Inc. v. Liberty W.
Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Utah 1998), as applied to corporations, the trial
court in this matter merely followed precedent. However, the facts and legal issues
in the present case before this Court are distinguishable from Banyan and Aurora
for the reasons stated infra.
b) The Closely-Held Corporation Exception Should Not Apply to
Claims Asserted Against Third-Parties. The closely-held corporation exception
should not allow claims against third-parties because such a rule permits
nonsignators to a contract to assert contract claims that bind third-parties to submit
1

6 In Heppler, the court observed that the plaintiffs “had total control of the litigation,” and
“were primed to take the benefits of an award of attorney fees if they won....” (Heppler,
supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 497.) The Heppler court relied on these facts in
determining that there was sufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's conclusion that the
plaintiffs' attorney fee **417 obligation was within the scope of the contractual assignment at
issue in that case. As in Heppler, Nicholas was in control of the litigation and was primed to take
the benefits if he had prevailed.7 The result we reach in this case is thus both legally correct as
well as equitable.
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to obligations they did not agree to. Gold’s Gym did not agree to be liable to pay
the Plaintiffs’ for damages they personally suffered. Moreover, there is no Utah
case that applies the closely-held corporation exception to a third party, and thus,
because allowing derivative claims against third-parties would sanction injustice of
exposing third-parties to claims that they did not contractually accept, it should not
be expanded to do so. Just the opposite should occur. The closely-held corporation
exception should be limited to claims against directors and managing members if
not eliminated altogether.
The Court of Appeals recognized limitations to the closely-held entity
exceptions that allows a derivative action to be maintained only if: (i) The
defendants will not be unfairly exposed to a multiplicity of actions; (ii) the interests
of the LLC’s creditors will not be materially prejudiced; and (iii) the direct suit
will not interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among the interested
persons. Bouycen Inc. Co. v. Evans, 2012 UT App. 333, ¶16, citing, GLFP, Ltd. V.
CL Mgmt., Ltd., 163 p.3d 636 (Utah ct. App. 2007); quoting American Law
Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance; Analysis and Recommendations
§7.01(d) (1994).
Third-party direct actions will almost always run afoul of all three
limitations. Defendants would be exposed to a multiplicity of lawsuits because the
minority interest suit leaves the third-party exposed to suit by other members (or
shareholders) and also by the management and company itself. Creditors are
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unfairly prejudiced because they are forced to defend claims asserted by
individuals with whom they did not contract or agree to be subject to potential
liability. Further, a fair distribution of the proceeds requires proceeds to remitted to
the company and then distributed - - but only a minority of members are parties to
collect proceeds. As in this case, it is likely to be unclear just who is entitled to any
proceeds that may be recovered. Thus, closely-held derivative action rules should
not allow claims against third-parties.
It is worth noting that every case in Utah which has applied the closelyheld exception has been claims against company management by members or
shareholders and not against third parties.

c) The Closely-Held Corporation Exception Should No Longer Be
Recognized Under Utah Law, and Certainly Not Under the Facts of This
Case. To bring a direct claim a shareholder or LLC member should be required to
show an injury distinct from the entity for which recovery is sought. Requiring a
distinct injury independent from the entity insures that recovery is limited to the
amount suffered by the plaintiffs directly. When less than all members of Limited
Liability Company assert an action or behalf of the company, the non-participating
members may gain a windfall. The non-participating members should not be
responsible for attorneys’ fees when they do not control litiagation. If recovery is
limited to the named Plaintiffs’ for their own damages then issues of amount of
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damages, who is entitled to judgment funds recovered and who is liable for
attorneys’ fees if there is a loss are all determined as a matter of law. However, if
plaintiffs are allowed to pursue claims against third parties for injuries suffered
only by the company, then all of these issues may result in injustice. In third party
actions for example, only those bringing an action should be responsible for
attorneys’ fees because they control the litigation decisions. They also should alone
be responsible for attorneys’ fees because they made the decision to pursue
litigation. See Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1263, 1291 87 Cal.
Rptr. 2nd 497 (1999)2 (Footnote omitted)
The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated that “[f]rom our vantage
point eight years after Aurora, we can see that our proclamation of a “growing
trend” in recognizing an exception to the derivative action rule for closely held
corporations may have overstated matters.” Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT
23, ¶ 16, 134 P.3d 1139, 1145. “Some jurisdictions have rejected the closely held
corporation

exception

or

severely

limited

it.”

Id.

(citing

Peter

H.

Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West
2

6 In Heppler, the court observed that the plaintiffs “had total control of the litigation,” and
“were primed to take the benefits of an award of attorney fees if they won....” (Heppler,
supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 497.) The Heppler court relied on these facts in
determining that there was sufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's conclusion that the
plaintiffs' attorney fee **417 obligation was within the scope of the contractual assignment at
issue in that case. As in Heppler, Nicholas was in control of the litigation and was primed to take
the benefits if he had prevailed.7 The result we reach in this case is thus both legally correct as
well as equitable.
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Development, Inc., 2002 Utah L.Rev. 519, 532–33). “Since Aurora, we have not
had the opportunity to fully delineate the bounds of the exception in Utah.
However, such a task must wait for another day because the Company in this case
is not a closely held corporation, nor is its cast of shareholders and principals as
small as that present in Aurora.” Id. That “another day” has come.
The closely-held corporation exception should be eliminated in third-party
cases based on the very problems this case illustrates. When members of a closelyheld corporation step into the shoes of the corporation, and sue a third party on
behalf of the corporation, the members are allowed to impose on third parties
obligations to respond to claims by members where the third-party never agreed to
accept the risk or liability. Furthermore, if the members sue a third-party on behalf
of the corporation pursuant to a contract – of which the members are
nonsignatories – the members should be required to be bound by the burdens of
the contract if they are seeking the benefits thereunder.
4. A Non-Party to a Contract Who Asserts the Benefits of the Contract
Cannot Escape the Burdens of the Contract, Including an Attorneys’ Fee
Provision In the Contract. Under Utah law, “[a] party cannot accept the benefits
of a contract and reject its burdens.” Richardson v. Rupper, 2014 UT App 11, ¶ 11,
318 P.3d 1218, 1221; see also Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 372, 325 P.2d 899, 903 (1958) (“In the absence of
expressly so reserving its rights, Hartford cannot accept the benefits of the contract
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and reject the burdens.”); Francisconi v. Hall, 2008 UT App 166 (“However, Hall
could not continue to receive the benefits of the bargain and simultaneously claim
to be released from further performance of her own obligations.”); see id. (“A
plaintiff cannot simultaneously claim the benefits of a contract and repudiate its
burdens and conditions.”) (Quoting Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Gregor, 777
So.2d 79, 82 (Ala.2000)).
As a practical matter, the trial court erred in allowing Appellees to proceed
as a direct action. The trial court held in essence that Appellees could assert claims
under a contract to which they were not parties.
“Traditionally, five theories for binding a nonsignatories to a [contract]
have been recognized: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency;
(4) veil-piercing/alter-ego; and (5) estoppel.” Ellsworth v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
2006 UT 77, 148 P.3d 983, 989 n.11 (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen
Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir.2000). “Sometimes a
sixth theory, third-party beneficiary, is added, but it is closely analogous to
the estoppel theory.” Id. (citing Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347,
356, 362 (5th Cir.2003)). “Another variety of nonsignatory estoppel is that
enforced by a nonsignatory when the signatory plaintiff sues a nonsignatory
defendant on the contract but seeks to avoid the contract-mandated arbitration by
relying on the fact that the defendant is a nonsignatory.” Id. at 989 n.12 (citations
omitted). “The rationale behind [these] exception[s] is that a nonsignatory should
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be estopped from avoiding [the burdens of the contract] when the nonsignatory
seeks to benefit from some portions of the contract….” Id. at 989 (citations
omitted).
Although it appears that the nonsignatory estoppel exception has not been
applied in Utah, it is a recognized legal doctrine in Utah, see supra. See id. at 989
n.11 (“Mr. Ellsworth correctly points out that the nonsignatory estoppel exception
has never been [correctly] applied in Utah. Nevertheless, we know of no reason
why it could not be, in the appropriate situation.”). In Ellsworth, the nonsignatory
estoppel exception did not apply because the plaintiff was “not attempting to sue
Lowell on the contract; on the contrary, he seeks to avoid the obligations of the
contract

altogether.”

Id.

at

989.

In

addition,

“he

has

not

received

any direct benefit from the contract.” Id. As a result, the Utah Supreme Court in
Ellsworth held “that the nonsignatory estoppel exception does not apply to Mr.
Ellsworth, a nonsignatory who is not suing on the contract and who has not
received direct benefits from the contract.” Id. Ellsworth is distinguishable from
the present matter because Appellees asserted a claim against Gold’s Gym under
the License Agreement. Not only did Appellees sue Gold’s Gym pursuant to the
License Agreement, all of their remaining claims arose out of and related to rejects
created solely by the License Agreement. For example, Appellees claimed that
Gold’s Gym converted the Appellees’ franchise rights created by the License
Agreement and that Gold’s Gym conspired with the other Defendants to do so. In
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addition, Appellees sought multiple direct benefits under the contract, including
interests owned solely by Health Source under the Licensing Agreement:
(i) All of the real and personal property at the St. George franchise
location and building;
(ii) All of the gym membership contracts pursuant to the License
Agreement;
(iii) The rights to the franchise agreement.
Thus, Appellees were allowed to pursue claims against a party to the
License Agreement (Gold’s Gym) to which they were not parties. The
nonsignatory estoppel exception is not appropriate under these circumstances.
Finally, multiple other jurisdictions have applied the nonsignatory estoppel
exception in a variety of settings, including requiring a non-party to a contract to
pay attorneys’ fees. An overview of the circumstances when the nonsignatory
estoppel exception applies is critical to the present analysis to determine that
Appellees cannot accept the benefits of the License Agreement and then escape its
burdens.
a) Arbitration. The Supreme Court of Texas’ decision In re Weekley
Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex. 2005), is demonstrative of this legal
principle in the arbitration context. In Weekly Homes, the plaintiff claimed the
authority of the Purchase Agreement and “repeatedly demanded extensive repairs
to “our home,” personally requested and received financial reimbursement for
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expenses “I incurred” while those repairs were made, and conducted settlement
negotiations with Weekley (apparently never consummated) about moving the
family to a new home.” Id. “Having obtained these substantial actions from
Weekley by demanding compliance with provisions of the contract, Von Bargen
cannot equitably object to the arbitration clause attached to them.” Id. “In addition
to these benefits, Foresting and the Trust have sued Weekley on claims which are
explicitly based on the contract.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that “we agree with the federal courts that when a
nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that others treat it as a party, it cannot
later “turn[ ] its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause,
that it finds distasteful.” Id. (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen &
Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2000) (estopping nonsignatory from
denying agreement to arbitrate “when he has consistently maintained that other
provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.”); see Bridas
S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“Direct[-]benefits estoppel applies when a nonsignatory ‘knowingly exploits the
agreement containing the arbitration clause.’ ”) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d
Cir. 2001)); Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349,
353 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring nonsignatories to arbitrate pursuant to provision in
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contract they neither requested nor executed, as they had duty to obtain that
contract and received copies of it and direct benefits under the contract).
b) Forum Selection Provisions. Many courts have found that nonsignators are bound by forum selection clauses. For example the Court in Carlyle
Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. held that:
With respect to the second element, even if defendants are not parties to the
agreement or third-party beneficiaries of it, they may be bound by
the forum selection clause if they are closely related to the agreement in such a
way that it would be foreseeable that they would be bound. See Weygandt, 2009
WL 1351808, at *4. In determining whether a non-signatory is closely related to a
contract, courts consider the non-signatory's ownership of the signatory, its
involvement in the negotiations, the relationship between the two parties and
whether the non-signatory received a direct benefit from the agreement. See id. at
*4–5; CapitalGrp., 2004WL2521295,at*6–7.
Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2015)
In addition, the Court in Keehan, Tennessee Inc. LLC. v. Praetorium Secured Fund I,
held that:
An exception to this rule exists when a non-party “is so closely related to the
dispute that it is foreseeable that the party will be bound.” Highway Commercial
Servs. v. Zitis, No. 2:07–cv–1252, 2008 WL 1809117, *4 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 21,
2008).3 20 {¶ 34} Some jurisdictions have applied this exception to shareholders,
officers, and directors of a corporation-signatory and to corporations wholly
owned and controlled by a signatory. See Marano Ents. of Kansas v. Z–Teca
Restaurants, L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Circ.2001); Hugel v. Corp. of
Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 209–210 (7th Circ.1993). In Ohio, this exception appears
to have only been applied, thus far, to agent-principal situations and to third-party
beneficiaries of a contract. See WashPro Express, supra, at ¶ 13; Barrett v. Picker
Internatl., Inc., 68 Ohio App.3d 820, 826, 589 N.E.2d 1372 (8th Dist.1990). The
essential inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “ ‘it is fair
and reasonable to bind a non-party to the forum selection clause. * * * [T]his
approach places emphasis on whether it should have been reasonably foreseeable
to the non-signatory that situations might arise in which the non-signatory would
become involved in the relevant contract dispute.’ ” Veteran Payment Sys., LLC v.
Gossage, No. 5:14CV981, 2015 WL 545764, *8 (N.D.Ohio Feb. 10, 2015),
quoting Regions Bank v. Wyndham Hotel Mgt., Inc., No. 3:09–1054, 2010 WL
908753, *6 (M.D.Tenn. Mar. 11, 2010).
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Keehan Tennessee Invest., L.L.C. v. Praetorium Secured Fund I, L.P., 2016-Ohio-8390, ¶¶ 3334, 71 N.E.3d 325, 333
Finally, the Court in XR Co. v. Block & Balestri stated:
Where the interests of a non-party are “completely derivative of”, that is,
“directly related to, if not predicated upon” those of a contracting party, the nonparty is bound by the contract's forum selection clause. Id. In this case, it is
undisputed that Koeppel is the sole and controlling shareholder of XR Co. and
that the acquisition of Ocean by XR Co. would inure to his personal benefit.
Therefore, even if Koeppel did not sign the letter agreement in his individual
capacity, he is still bound by the forum selection clause contained in the
agreement.
XR Co. v. Block & Balestri, P.C., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 1999)

c) Bankruptcy. “Section 365(f) requires a debtor to assume a contract
subject to the benefits and burdens thereunder.” In re Fleming Companies, Inc.,
499 F.3d 300, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “The [debtor]...may not blow
hot and cold. If he accepts the contract he accepts it cum onere. If he receives
the benefits he must adopt the burdens. He cannot accept one and reject the other.”
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 849 (4th Cir.
1999) (“When the debtor assumes its unexpired lease, however, it assumes it cum
onere-the debtor must accept obligations of the executory contract along with
the benefits”, including the collection of “[a]ttorneys’ fees incurred in attempting
to collect sums due from debtors following default….”); In re Nat'l Gypsum Co.,
208 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Where the debtor assumes an
executory contract, it must assume the entire contract, cum onere—the debtor
accepts both the obligations and the benefits of the executory contract.”). Thus,
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there is ample case law holding that a non-party to a contract is subjected to the
benefits as well as the burdens of an assumed contract in the bankruptcy setting.
d) Attorneys’ Fees. In Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc.,
228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 110, 278 Cal. Rptr. 758, 768 (Ct. App. 1991), the California
Court of Appeals dealt with the precise issue at hand, and held that:
“[i]t would be “extraordinarily inequitable” to deny them
attorney’s fees because plaintiffs who are not signatories chose to sue
on the contracts in an action on behalf of the corporation when the
corporation would not bring suit itself.” In addition to principles of
equity, the Brusso court found that “liabilities for fees here are
predicated on breach of three contracts.” Id. at 108, 278 Cal. Rptr. at
767. First, “[t]he individual warranties on the purchase agreement
signed by the plaintiffs, individually and not on behalf of the
corporation, specifically apply to section 11, the attorney’s fees
section.” Id. at 109, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 767. Second, “Section 16 of the
purchase agreement states, “[t]he parties hereto agree that any breach
of any term or condition of this Agreement shall constitute a material
breach of this Agreement.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the parties
contemplated that a breach of the management agreement would be a
material breach of the purchase agreement, and also subject to the
section 11 attorney’s fees provision.” Id. As for third contract at issue,
the court noted that “the lease also contains its own attorney’s fees
provision. The only signatories there are the corporation and
defendant William E. Clark. However, as we discuss below, the trial
court was correct in directing the individual plaintiffs, not the
corporation, to pay the defendants’ fees.” Id.
In the present matter, the Appellees must be liable for Gold’s Gym’s costs
and attorneys’ fees.
However, the Members cannot use the entity as a sword when it is
advantageous but then utilize it as a shield to avoid fees. Because the Members
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elected to sue Gold’s Gym on behalf of HSSG, despite the fact that the Members
are not signatories to the License Agreement, the Members assumed all of the risks
and obligations thereunder, including the obligation to reimburse Gold’s Gym its
reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Similarly, in California Wholesale Material Supply, Inc. v. Norm Wilson &
Sons, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 4th 598, 608, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 396–97 (2002), “the
Plaintiff, CalPly, is the nonsignatory party and the defendant, Wilson, signed the
subcontract.” The court stated that “[h]ad CalPly prevailed on its cause of action as
the assignee of Johnwall's rights under the Wilson/Johnwall subcontract, Wilson
would have been liable to CalPly for attorney fees pursuant to the subcontract.
Consequently, because Wilson would have been liable for attorney fees pursuant to
the attorney fee provision had CalPly prevailed, Wilson is entitled to recover
attorney fees pursuant to the subcontract now that it has prevailed.” Id. at 397
(citations omitted). The court concluded that although CalPly was a nonsignatory
to the subcontract between Wilson and Johnwall, it could be held liable for
Wilson's attorney fees. Id.
In Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1265, 1290, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d
497 (1999), the Plaintiffs were assigned contractual rights although they were
nonsignatories to the contract. “By virtue of the assignment, plaintiffs became
owners of Peters’s indemnity rights and were completely in charge of the litigation.
Plaintiffs chose to pursue each of the prevailing nonsettling subcontractors through
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trial. They had the option to settle with the subcontractors without incurring
attorney fee obligations (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2)), but chose not to.” Id.
“Plaintiffs also had the power to dismiss the cross-complaints against the
subcontractors and avoid any obligation for attorney fees. This is so because unless
the cross-complaint went to judgment there would be no prevailing party within
the meaning of Civil Code section 1717 and no one would have the right to recover
attorney fees under the subcontracts.” Id. at 1290-91. “Plaintiffs were primed to
take the benefits of an award of attorney fees if they won; thus it was reasonable
for the court to infer plaintiffs were prepared to take the concomitant obligation to
pay attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 if they lost.” Id. at 1291. The
court provided: “An age-old maxim of equity is particularly appropriate here: “He
who takes the benefit must bear the burden.” Id. (citing Civ. Code, §
3521). “Clearly, the plaintiffs were prepared to reap Peters's presettlement and their
post settlement attorney fees if they had prevailed in the indemnity trial.” Id. Thus,
in this scenario, the nonsignatory to the contract was held liable for attorneys’ fees.
5. There Are Multiple Circumstances That When a Party “Steps Into
the Shoes” of Another Party to a Contract. The theories outlined in part IV of
this Brief are instances of non-signatories stepping into the shoes of those who
signed the contract. A party “steps into the shoes” of a contract signatory when it
seeks to benefit from claims under another’s contract. Common examples of
“stepping into the shoes of others” include factual transfers of contractual interest
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by assignment of the contract to a third party or subrogation right in which a third
party accedes to the rights of a first party to a contract.
In effect, the trial court in this case treated Plaintiffs as if though they were
formal assignees of Health Source’s claims. An assignee accepts both the benefit and
burdens of a contract, including the obligation to pay attorneys’ fees.

CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES - Rule 24(a) (9) U.R.A.P.
As argued herein at length, Gold’s Gym is entitled to attorneys’ fees under
the License Agreement because it was the prevailing party to this action.

CONCLUSION – Rule 24(a) (10) U.R.A.P.
For the a reasons set forth above, Gold’s Gym respectfully requests this
Court to reverse the trial court’s order denying Gold’s Gym the right to attorneys’
fees, and to award Gold’s Gym its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred throughout
the duration of this lawsuit.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE – Rule 24(a) (11) U.R.A.P.
I certify that in compliance with U.R.A.P. 24(a) (11), this brief contains 6,376
words, excluding the Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and addenda. I
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relied on my word processor to obtain the count, which is Microsoft Word. I
further certify that this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word in compliance with Utah R. App. P. 27(b). I certify that the
information on this form is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry.

ADDENDUM– Rule 24(a) (12) U.R.A.P.
Exhibit A, License Agreement………………………………………..……..8,12,36

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of June, 2019.

OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON
/s/ Blake T. Ostler
By: Blake T. Ostler
Attorney for Gold’s Gym International, Inc.
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